Funds Probe
Unfairly Spared White House, '98 Report Says
Donations:
Revelations from long-sealed report show internal dissension on Reno's refusal
to appoint counsel.
By WILLIAM
C. REMPEL and ALAN C. MILLER, Times Staff Writers
WASHINGTON--A confidential report by the
Justice Department's former chief campaign finance investigator, kept sealed by
Atty. Gen. Janet Reno for nearly two years, accused senior Justice officials of
engaging in "gamesmanship" and legal "contortions" to avoid
an independent inquiry into Clinton-Gore campaign fund-raising abuses.
According to an edited version of the
94-page document, former task force supervisor Charles G. LaBella also faulted
Reno's top advisors for using "intellectually dishonest" double
standards: endorsing independent counsels to investigate Cabinet-level
administration officials while opposing them for similar or stronger cases
involving senior White House figures.
Among those getting special treatment,
the report said, were President Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, First Lady
Hillary Rodham Clinton and former White House aide Harold M. Ickes. It is the
first indication that the task force was considering Mrs. Clinton's conduct in
the fund-raising scandal.
The bluntly worded July 1998 report also
called for a sweeping outside investigation into "the entire
landscape" of campaign finance allegations, referring to the possibility
of broad schemes "conjured up by sophisticated political operatives to
circumvent" election finance laws during the 1996 presidential race.
Senior Justice Department officials
strongly rejected LaBella's assertions, saying that the report leaped to
"outrageous" conclusions and personalized policy differences.
According to Justice Department spokesman Myron Marlin, Reno "based her
decision on the facts and the laws without regard to politics, the pundits or
pressure."
It has long been known that LaBella, as
well as FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, supported the appointment of an
independent counsel, but the previously undisclosed documents provide an
extraordinary glimpse behind the scenes of a Justice Department storm that
swirled around Reno's controversial rejections of outside counsels.
They also include LaBella's stinging
indictment of a campaign finance system that he said encourages abuse by both
major parties and of enforcement of fund-raising laws that he said is so weak
it is "a bad joke" on the American public.
Since receiving the report, Reno has kept
it within the Justice Department and defied congressional pressure to release
it, even under threat of contempt action. A handful of Congress members and
aides have been allowed to read the report under strictly controlled
circumstances. The Times reviewed an excised version of the report and related
documents.
Ammunition for Reno's Critics
The disclosures are certain to provide
Reno's critics, including Republican lawmakers, with powerful ammunition to
renew charges that she acted to protect the White House. Already, last week's
conviction of longtime Gore fund-raiser Maria Hsia on campaign finance
violations resurrected Republican charges that the Justice Department has
failed to get to the bottom of the scandal.
And questions raised about Gore and
Hillary Clinton in the long-sealed documents could ricochet across the 2000
political landscape as well, as Gore seeks the Democratic presidential
nomination and the first lady bids for a U.S. Senate seat in New York. Ickes, a
former White House deputy chief of staff who spearheaded the Clinton-Gore
reelection effort, is a key figure in Mrs. Clinton's Senate campaign.
LaBella's accusations are particularly
troubling for the Clinton administration because the career prosecutor was
hand-picked in September 1997 to bolster public confidence in the Justice
Department-controlled investigations of political fund-raising abuses.
It was Reno who chose LaBella to head the
Campaign Financing Task Force and salvage much-criticized investigations then
run by the department's Public Integrity Section. He arrived with a reputation
as an aggressive prosecutor from high-profile cases in New York and San Diego,
where he served under both Republican and Democratic U.S. attorneys in such
positions as chief of the criminal and public corruption divisions.
"The failure of Reno to listen to
LaBella seems to me to put a cloud on the impartiality of the top of the
Justice Department in what was supposed to be the most ethical administration
in the history of the United States," said Henry Ruth, a former Watergate
special prosecutor and criminal defense attorney. "I can't remember . . .
someone at that level, plus the FBI, saying 'go' and the attorney general
vetoing it without satisfactory explanation."
Responding on behalf of Clinton, Gore and
the first lady, White House spokesman Jim Kennedy said: "We're not going
to comment on selectively leaked information that's allegedly from a sealed
report we've never seen. However, this whole matter has been investigated
repeatedly at a cost of millions of dollars with absolutely no finding of
wrongdoing on the part of the president, the vice president or the first
lady."
LaBella Stands by His Conclusions
LaBella said it would be
"inappropriate to comment" on his report while it remained
confidential. However, the former task force chief said that he stands by its
conclusions.
"It was the right advice then and
it's the right advice today," he said. "I still believe it's the only
way to avoid even unwarranted appearances of a political fix."
He said that Reno could yet refer the
matter to an outside special prosecutor under existing Justice guidelines, a
move that he recommends.
Ten months into his tenure with the task
force, LaBella filed his report to Reno, warning that numerous conflicts of
interest made the Justice Department's insistence that its own lawyers handle
the inquiry into the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign "a recipe for
disaster." LaBella was joined on what he called an "interim report"
by James V. DeSarno Jr., an assistant FBI director who supervised agents
assigned to the task force.
Under the independent counsel act, the
attorney general was required to seek an outside prosecutor upon receiving
credible information that the president, vice president or other senior
officials may have violated the law or when an investigation by the Justice
Department "may result in personal, financial or political conflict of
interest."
LaBella maintained that both
circumstances applied and that Justice officials "resisted a common-sense
. . . application" of the law.
No Specific Criminal Accusations Made
In singling out Clinton, Gore, Mrs.
Clinton and Ickes, LaBella's report did not accuse them of specific criminal
violations. Rather, it cited questionable actions by them and "a pattern
of conduct worthy of investigation" by an independent counsel.
For example, LaBella noted administration
dealings with various Asian American fund-raisers for the Democratic National
Committee as well as with wealthy foreign nationals that it said "suggests
a level of knowledge within the White House--including the president's and
first lady's offices--concerning the injection of foreign funds into the
reelection effort."
The report said that one of the common
themes among various cases under review at the time was "the calculated
use of access" to the White House and high-level officials,
"including the president and vice president."
The previously secret documents
contradict Reno's assurances to Congress that no serious rifts divided her
Justice Department advisors. Indeed, documents and interviews with a number of
former task force members reveal a bureaucratic brawl that went well beyond the
commonplace tensions between hard-nosed field prosecutors and seasoned
Washington superiors.
"They didn't want us to succeed. It
made them look bad," said one former task force attorney who described
"unprecedented hostility" from senior Justice officials.
Another former task force prosecutor,
Steve Clark of San Diego, complained in a scathing internal memo in December
1997 that his efforts to investigate possible corruption by both major parties
was frustrated by "behind-the-scenes maneuvering, personal animosity,
distortions of fact and contortions of law" by high-level Justice
officials.
Top Justice lawyers took strong exception
to the LaBella report. Its frank language privately outraged some of Reno's
closest advisors.
Lee J. Radek, chief of the Public
Integrity Section, responded with a blistering letter to Reno. He called
LaBella's legal arguments "flawed," challenged the grounds for
implicating the first lady and ridiculed the underlying elements of LaBella's
case for an independent counsel. He said that, given one legal standard LaBella
sought to apply, "every member of Congress would be under criminal
investigation."
Radek, a 29-year Justice Department
veteran and staunch foe of independent counsel referrals for Gore, Ickes and
the Clintons, also said that he was furious over LaBella's suggestion that the
motivations of some Reno aides were "colored by bad faith, a deliberate
twisting of the law and an effort to protect the White House."
LaBella, who was a senior field
prosecutor in San Diego, replaced one of Radek's staff attorneys who was dumped
after a series of investigative embarrassments and accusations of mismanagement
put the task force under heavy political fire.
Radek said in an interview that he and
LaBella had "an honest disagreement" about the application of the
independent counsel act but that "the attorney general's standing order
was to leave no stone unturned."
In fact, he said, "because of the
sensitivity of this we went beyond the normal parameters of a criminal
investigation and tried to find out all the facts, whether or not they were
included in what is traditionally a criminal investigation."
Since the fund-raising controversy broke
in newspaper headlines in late 1996, Reno repeatedly has rejected outside
prosecutors for narrowly focused investigations of alleged White House
wrongdoing. She did so following preliminary reviews of such matters as
fund-raising telephone calls by Gore from the White House, so-called
"issues ads" funded by the Democratic National Committee and congressional
testimony by Ickes.
She also opposed requests for sweeping
inquiries as proposed by LaBella and Freeh.
Since becoming attorney general in 1993,
Reno has requested appointments of seven outside prosecutors, including one in
the Whitewater scandal. After that inquiry by Kenneth W. Starr evolved into the
Monica S. Lewinsky case, concerns rose over whether excessive power had been
given to overly zealous independent counsels. Congress let the statute expire
last year, a move endorsed by Reno.
LaBella left the task force voluntarily
days after filing his report to return to San Diego as acting U.S. attorney.
But, when he was passed over for the permanent federal appointment in 1999, he
ended his 17-year government career and joined Decision Strategies Fairfax
International, a private investigation firm. Reno's Republican critics accused
the administration of denying LaBella the U.S. attorney's job as punishment for
recommending an independent counsel.
Underlying LaBella's argument for an
outside prosecutor was criticism of what he called an excessively narrow
"stovepipe approach" to myriad campaign finance allegations. His
report urged a broader investigation, in part, because seemingly innocent
conduct in one inquiry could take on a more sinister gloss when viewed in the
context of other cases.
"This is especially true with
respect to the conduct of senior White House officials and key DNC and
Clinton/Gore officials," the report said.
At the same time, the report seemed to
minimize the likelihood of a single, centrally controlled or highly disciplined
conspiracy. It said: "The campaign finance allegations . . . present the
earmarks of a loose enterprise employing different actors at different levels
who share a common goal: Bring in the money."
Appointment of Trie Questioned
Although half of the report reviewed by
The Times was excised to protect grand jury secrecy and ongoing investigations,
some of the deleted material was pieced together from other documents. Most of
that missing information relates directly to the task force cases against
Clinton, Gore, Ickes and Mrs. Clinton.
In one instance, documents show, task
force investigators regarded as suspicious the timing of Clinton's appointment
of friend and fund-raiser Yah Lin "Charlie" Trie to a U.S.-Pacific
trade advisory panel in 1996. That appointment came shortly after Trie
delivered $460,000 in donations from a Taiwan-based Buddhist sect to the
president's legal defense trust fund, set up to help defray the Clintons'
private legal bills. An investigative document called this "a potential
quid pro quo" that should be probed by an independent counsel.
Ultimately, Trie acted as a
self-described "mailman," delivering a total of $639,000 in checks
and money orders from the Buddhist group. The entire amount was rejected by the
trust, however, on grounds that it was from foreign sources.
Both Ickes and Mrs. Clinton met with the
defense fund trustee to discuss Trie's donations, and the first lady and
president agreed that the money should be returned. According to the report,
none of the three--the president, Mrs. Clinton or Ickes--informed the DNC,
where Trie was a major fund-raiser, that he was bringing in foreign donations
to the Democrats, which was illegal.
The report said that each had, at least
arguably, a fiduciary responsibility to alert Democratic officials and said
that Mrs. Clinton's "potential criminal involvement" grew out of this
failure. Trie continued to raise large sums for the Democrats. He pleaded
guilty to campaign finance violations last May.
While the report acknowledged that the
task force information against the first lady was "not overwhelming at
this time," it said it was sufficient "to warrant further inquiry."
In his response to LaBella's report a few
days later, Radek countered that, based on these facts, he was unaware of any
legal theory under which Mrs. Clinton could be prosecuted and said that LaBella
failed to supply one.
Ickes, who declined to be interviewed,
told Senate investigators that he "never connected" Trie with
fund-raising for the DNC until his name surfaced in news stories in October
1996; he then contacted a party official.
The report also contended that Clinton
knew or should have known some of his supporters were bringing in foreign
money. It cited circumstantial evidence suggesting "a conscious avoidance
of the truth concerning some of the more flamboyant fund-raisers such as
Trie."
Radek dismissed such arguments as vague
and said that he found Clinton's professed lack of knowledge believable because
it was "very unlikely" that notorious fund-raisers informed anyone
they were making illegal donations.
Regarding Gore, task force documents
indicate skepticism of the vice president's "failure of recollection"
and other inconsistencies in his story. The report said that Gore "may
have provided false testimony."
The allegation stems from a marathon
fund-raising effort launched over White House phones in late 1995, purportedly
to raise unrestricted "soft money," which was outside the election
law ban on political fund-raising conducted from a federal workplace. The money
was for ads to help the DNC and state party organizations.
Gore told investigators he believed that
no "hard money" was raised or used in the media fund. Democratic
records later showed that some money Gore raised did, in fact, end up in
hard-money accounts.
Soft money refers to unlimited
contributions by individuals, corporations and labor unions to political
parties that are not regulated by federal election law. Hard money refers to
restricted donations that can be spent directly on behalf of candidates.
Gore denied any wrongdoing. In his
initial defense of the calls in March 1997, he maintained that he broke no laws
because there was "no controlling legal authority" covering such
fund-raising solicitations. Later, the DNC said that funds were allocated to
hard-money accounts without Gore's knowledge.
Confronted with notes and memos
indicating that a November 1995 meeting Gore attended in the Map Room of the
White House included discussions about raising hard money, the vice president
said he did not recall such conversations or the memos.
Previously undisclosed documents show
that former White House Chief of Staff Leon E. Panetta told FBI agents that he
remembered Gore "attentively listening" to discussions about the hard
money aspects of the media fund and "walking through the papers" as the
November 1995 meeting progressed. These documents also indicate that the task
force obtained photographs from that meeting showing Gore looking at papers
that he said he did not recall reviewing.
Reno ordered an initial 90-day review of
the Gore phone calls in 1997 before deciding there was not sufficient grounds
to ask for an independent counsel. When a new memo from the 1995 meeting was
discovered, however, Reno launched a second 90-day review to determine if
outside counsel should investigate perjury allegations against Gore.
Radek and Public Integrity opposed the
referral. In November 1998, in a statement and detailed 19-page court
submission citing "clear and convincing" evidence that Gore did not
lie about the matter, Reno again decided against asking for an outside
prosecutor. The action spared Gore an investigation likely to overlap his
presidential campaign.
In contrast, independent counsel
referrals in cases involving Labor Secretary Alexis M. Herman and Interior
Secretary Bruce Babbitt were based on "a lower quantum" of
information than that available on Gore and other top White House officials,
the report said.
A substantial portion of LaBella's report
cited flaws in campaign finance laws and suggested legal and policy reforms.
Among major obstacles to enforcement, it
said, are laws that make serious campaign finance offenses misdemeanors rather
than felonies, a truncated statute of limitations that forces prosecutions
within three years instead of five and the absence of credible civil remedies
when criminal sanctions are not appropriate.
"The fact is that the so-called
enforcement system is nothing more than a bad joke," the report said,
blaming "loopholes . . . , opportunists and the elected officials in
desperate need of funds to fuel media campaigns" for undermining the
system.
LaBella called for overhauling the
Federal Election Commission to create an agency comparable to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, staffed to conduct sophisticated investigations and
empowered to levy heavy financial sanctions on campaign finance violators.
Both the Republican National Committee
and the DNC "pay lip service . . . but nothing more" to complying
with federal fund-raising laws, the report said.
In fact, during the 1996 campaign, each
party spent less to assure that its fund-raising was legal, the report said,
than it did securing "red, white and blue balloons for release on election
night."